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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: TEMPORARY
SUSPENSIONS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The courts have recognized that students are entitled to due process
protection when threatened with expulsion from school.' The Supreme
Court of the United States recently extended the minimum due process
safeguards of notice and hearing to students threatened with short
suspensions. 2 The Court found that the students had property and
liberty interests in public education 3 and were entitled to protection
from arbitrary disciplinary action.4
Goss v. Lopez5 arose out of a period of racial confrontation and
student unrest in 1971.6 School administrators suspended students7
involved in incidents that varied in severity from assaulting a police
officer8 to simply being present at a demonstration. 9 Nine students
1. Since Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150(5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961), it has been recognized that students at tax-supported educational
institutions may not be expelled without prior notice and hearing. See, e.g., Esteban v.
Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965
(1970); Fielder v. Board of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 722,729 (D. Neb. 1972). See also General
Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline
in Tax-Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133, 147-48 (W.D. Mo.
1968) (en banc).
2. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), aff'gsub nom. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp.
1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
Goss is one of several challenges to short suspensions. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Houston
Independent School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973);
Graham v. Knutzen, 351 F. Supp. 642 (D. Neb. 1972); Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202
(W.D.N.C. 1972); Black Students of N. Ft. Myers Jr.-Sr. High School v. Williams, 335 F.
Supp. 820 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972).
3. 419 U.S. at 574.
4. Id. at 574.
5. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
6. Id. at 569.
7. State law authorizes school administrators to suspend pupils for not more than 10
days. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (Page 1972).
8. Plaintiff Rudolph Sutton physically attacked a police officer who was attempting to
remove another student from the school auditorium. Both students were immediately
suspended. 419 U.S. at 570.
9. Plaintiff Dwight Lopez testified that he had been an innocent bystander to a
disturbance in the lunchroom. Id. at 570. Plaintiff Betty Crome testified to being present at
a demonstration at a high school other than the one she was attending, when she was
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brought a class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 10 The
district court declared the state statute, which permitted student suspen-
sion without a hearing," unconstitutional and ordered the removal of
references to past suspensions from the students' records.' 2 The Su-
preme Court affirmed, holding suspensions from public school without
prior notice or hearing violative of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 3 There was, however, substantial disagree-
ment among the justices over the propriety of the Court's expansion of
procedural protection and of increasing judicial intervention in public
education.14
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects the
individual against arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable action by
the government. 5 Due process of law is so ingrained in our national
tradition that exceptions to the requirement of prior notice and the
opportunity to be heard 6 are allowed only in emergency situations.17
But procedural due process extends only to the deprivation of those
interests within the fourteenth amendment's protection of life, liberty
and property.' 8 The Supreme Court has accorded such protection to
many peripheral property 19 and liberty20 interests. The Court no longer
arrested with other students and then released without charge. She was notified that she
had been suspended before the start of school the next day. Id. at 570-71.
10. The students filed the action against the Columbus Board of Education and the
administrators of the Columbus Public School System under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). 419
U.S. at 568. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (§ 1983 is applicable to those who
carry the badge of state authority and represent in some capacity state action, whether in
accordance with their authority or its misuse).
11. OHfo REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (Page 1972).
12. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
13. 419 U.S. at 566.
14. Id. at 584 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist joined in the dissent.
15. "Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance that
there will be equal justice underthe law." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring).
16. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,313 (1950).
17. The Court has held that in rare and extraordinary situations deprivation of a
protected interest need not be preceded by the opportunity for some kind of hearing. See,
e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of mislabeled
vitamins).
18. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
19. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (de facto tenure policy suffi-
cient property interest to entitle claimant to due process protection); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254,262 (1970) (welfare benefits); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d
150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (attendance at state university).




uses the right-privilege distinction21 to determine whether the fourteenth
amendment is applicable, but now applies a statutory entitlement test.22
In the landmark case Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education23
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the due process
clause applicable to disciplinary decisions made by tax-supported edu-
cational institutions. 24 The majority of subsequent challenges to discipli-
nary action have involved public colleges and universities,2 but in 1969
the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District26 extended due process protection to public school
children. 27 While acknowledging the broad interest of the state in the
operation of its school system through local boards of education, 28 the
status). Compare Sims v. Colfax Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Iowa
1970) (female student's long hair within protected liberty interest) andRichards v. Thur-
ston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1281 (Ist Cir. 1970) (male student's
long hair within protected property interest), with Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School
Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968) (court assumed hair style
was within liberty interest but upheld school regulation under the facts of the case).
21. Formerly state deprivation of significant forms of state largesse was not restricted
by the due process clause. The theoretical justification was that such deprivation resulted
not in the infringement of a right but in the mere loss of a privilege. See, e.g., Hamilton v.
Regents of Univ. of Calif., 293 U.S. 245, 261-62 (1934) (state university education is a
privilege; conditional enrollment upheld); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, aff'd by an
equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (public employment is a privilege).
22. If an individual is qualified to receive certain benefits under state law, then that
individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement to those benefits. Termination of such
benefits involves state deprivation of the recipient's property interest in the continued
receipt of the benefits and is protected by due process. See, e.g., Connell v. Higginbotham,
403 U.S. 207 (1971) (public employment as a statutory entitlement); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (welfare benefits as a statutory entitlement); Goldberg v. Regents of
Univ. of Calif., 248 Cal. App. 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (state university
education considered a government benefit comparable to public employment). Seegener-
ally Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment,
The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Reich, Individual Rights and
Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
23. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). See note 1 supra.
24. 294 F.2d at 154.
25. See. e.g., Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
26. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (summary suspension of public secondary school students for
wearing black armbands as an unconstitutional restriction of freedom of expression).
27. "Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution.
They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they
themselves must respect their obligations to the State." Id. at 511.
28. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (education is largely a
matter of local control). See also Goldstein, The Scope & Sources of School Board
Authority to Regulate Student Conduct & Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U.
PA. L. REV. 373, 375-76 (1969) (recommending that questions of scope of school board
authority should be resolved on nonconstitutional basis if possible).
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court stated that such control must be exercised consistently with
constitutional safeguards, including due process of law. 29
There are two distinct stages in due process analysis which, although
often telescoped together, are separate and sequential: (1) whether due
process is applicable at all, and (2) if applicable, what procedures are
required in the particular situation.30 In Goss the threshold question was
the primary issue: whether the students had a protected interest which
warranted procedural protection.
Protected interests are normally not created by the Constitution but
are created and defined by an independent source such as state statutes
or regulations entitling citizens to certain government benefits. 31 In
Goss state law specified both free public education and compulsory
attendance. 32 On the basis of these state laws, the Court concluded that
29. See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). The
Court has repeatedly stated that control of conduct within public schools must be consis-
tent with constitutional safeguards. This sensitivity is particularly acute when first amend-
ment freedoms are implicated. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
30. Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the
Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1510, 1510-11 (1974). For an example of a
two-step analysis see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 206-08 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
A conventional interest-balancing approach would consider factors such as the nature
of the interest adversely affected, the manner in which that interest is affected, reasons for
doing so, available alternatives to action taken, protection implicit in the office of the state
officer whose conduct is challenged, and the balance between the interest achieved and
the interest injured. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The Court must consider the risk and harm of
mistaken deprivations as well as the possible effect of requiring greater procedural
formality on the government action and program in evaluating whether the existing
procedure is fundamentally fair.
31. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972). A person must have more than
an abstract need or desire or subjective expectation of benefit to have a protected property
interest; he must have a legitimate claim of entitlement. See note 22 supra. See generally
Dimond, The Constitutional Right to Education: The Quiet Revolution, 24 HASTINGS L.J.
1087, 1087-90 (1973).
32. OHIo CONST. art. VI, § 2(1851); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.48,3313.64,3321.01
(Page 1972). Section 33 establishes a statewide, state-supported system of education. This
is an independent source that secures a specific government benefit and supports the
student's legitimate claim of entitlement to public education. The Goss dissent argued that
the same state statute that creates the right to a public education also defines its dimen-
sions by expressly authorizing short disciplinary suspensions in another section, id. §
3313.66. Such a qualified right to public education should, however, merit some pro-
cedural protection. For an example of procedural protection of a qualified right see Wolff
v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (cancellation of good-time credits) and Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (cancellation of parole status).




the students were entitled to a public education as a property right, 33 and
the state could not withdraw that right for misconduct absent fundamen-
tally fair procedures. 34
The Court also found that the students possessed a liberty interest in
keeping their school records free of any unwarranted references to
disciplinary suspensions. 35 Since the school suspensions were not de
minimis deprivations, 36 the relatively mild character of the punishment
was irrelevant to the question of whether the due process clause was
applicable. 37 Total exclusion from school for more than a trivial period
value is the right to attend the public schools without charge. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954); Cook v. Edwards, 341 F. Supp. 307,310-11 (D.N.H. 1972)
("No authority is needed for the fundamental American principle that a public school
education through high school is a basic right of all citizens."); cf. San Antonio Independ-
ent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.I, 29-30 (1973).
33. 419 U.S. at 574. Although the district court held education to be a liberty rather
than a property interest under state law, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1299 n. 16, the Supreme Court
found public education to be primarily a property interest. 419 U.S. at 573.
34. Once the state has conferred a benefit that amounts to a property or liberty interest,
any deprivation must meet the minimum standards of procedural due process. This is true
even when discharge procedures are provided by the statute which creates the specific
statutory entitlement. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974) (Powell, J., concur-
ring), 171 (White, J., concurring and dissenting), 206 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (non-
probationary government employee should be afforded evidentiary hearing prior to dis-
missal for cause).
35. 419 U.S. at 574-75. The Court found that the student's integrity and good standfng
within the school were threatened by the disciplinary action and that suspensions based
upon charges of misconduct, when made part of a student's record, could seriously
interfere with later opportunities for higher education and future employment. See, e.g.,
Hatter v. Los Angeles City High School Dist., 452 F.2d 673, 674 (9th Cir. 1971) (possible
prejudice to college admissions and future employment); Sullivan v. Houston Independ-
ent School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1338 (S.D. Tex. 1%9) (consideration of possible
collateral consequences from suspensions).
36. The degree of procedural due process depends on the extent to which an individual
will suffer grievous loss. Some form of notice and hearing is required before the depriva-
tion of any protected interest that is not de minimis. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 85-86 (1972). The severity of the deprivation may not be considered in the initial
determination of whether due process requirements apply. If applicable, the degree of
severity controls the procedural formality required. The distinction between determining
whether due process is applicable and "'what process is due" is not always clear. See419
U.S. at 576. The dissent argued that short suspensions are far from the serious damage
standard necessary for claims under the due process clause, and that discipline in the form
of suspensions is an essential part of education and good citizenship. Id. at 586 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
37 The dissent viewed suspensions as the traditional means used to maintain disci-
pline in public schools and as a routine, almost daily occurrence, the imposition and
adjustment of which is best done informally and at the discretion of the school adminis-
trators. The character of the discipline and the nature of public education led the dissent to
believe that the control and discipline of the public schools should be left to its traditional
guardians, the state legislature and educational authorities. 419 U.S. at 586 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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could be considered a serious disruption in the life of a school child. 38
School administrators have traditionally been allowed broad dis-
cretionary powers in the daily administration of public schools39 and
generally oppose procedural formalities in disciplinary hearings, fearing
the introduction of an adversary atmosphere into the educational proc-
ess. 40 The Court recognized the need for immediate, effective adminis-
trative action4' and the impracticality of complicated hearing proce-
38. Id. at 576. Traditionally suspensions have been regarded as a relatively mild form
of discipline that did not warrant notice or hearing. The most serious sanction, expulsion,
would merit greater procedural consideration than short suspensions. See, e.g., Black
Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1,484 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1973); Linwood v. Peoria
Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972); Dunn v. Tyler
Independent School Dist., 460 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
Recently it has been recognized that it is almost impossible to evaluate exclusions from
school for varying periods of time as major or minor punishments. A suspension of even
one hour can be critical to an individual student if that hour encompassed a final exam with
no provision for making up the exam period. Shanley v. Northeast Independent School
Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 967 n.4 (5th Cir. 1972); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 704 (W.D.
Wis. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970) (denial of access to public high school to
senior student as irreparable injury). See generally Abbott, Due Process and Secondary
School Dismissals, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 378, 392 (1969); Buss, Procedural Due
Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119U. PA. L. REv.545,
571-85 (1971); Flygare, Short-Term Student Suspensions & the Requirements of Due
Process, 3 J.L. & EDUC. 529, 529-30 (1974).
39. E.g., Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968) (interest of state in maintaining an effective and efficient
school system is of paramount importance; that which so interferes or hinders state in
providing best education possible for its people must be eliminated or circumscribed as
needed). Compare Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) (right to wear freedom
buttons not denied because no evidence that conduct interfered with educational process),
with Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (right to
wear freedom buttons denied where evidence demonstrated that such conduct interfered
with efficient operation of school).
40. The primary interest of the school is in the integrity of the educational process. The
conditions necessary for education include the best use of resources available, the
maintenance of teacher and administrator morale, and the welfare of the entire student
body. Schools prefer limiting the procedural complexity of disciplinary hearings, which
take time and money and detract from the cooperative relationship between the student
and the administration. The individual student, however, has much to lose if he is subject
to the school's arbitrary discipline: reputation, earning capacity if forced to withdraw,
psychological and social damage. SeeAbbott, supra note 38, at 382; Buss, supra note 38, at
573-77. The dissent adopted the conventional view of the essential congruence of the
interests of the state in its schools and pupils: the state's interest in an orderly school is not
incompatible with the individual interest of the student in obtaining an education, but in
fact is crucial to the learning environment of all students. 419 U.S. at 586-96 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). The reality of public education, if not adversary in orientation, often reflects
the tension that exists between the desires of the student and the administrator in the
educational system.




dures,42 but concluded that the student's interest in public education and
the prevention of possible injustice required procedural protection. 43
Before suspensions of up to ten days a student must now be given oral
or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an
explanation of such charges and the evidence supporting them, with the
opportunity to present his version of the incident.44 The Court specified
that the notice and hearing should generally precede removal from
school, since the hearing should immediately follow the misconduct. 45
But when prior notice and hearing are not possible, the Court indicated
that the necessary notice and hearing could then follow any disciplinary
action.46
The right to a prior hearing in the school context is qualified by
important practical considerations. The bare right to an informal
hearing is of little practical significance in guaranteeing fundamental
fairness when that decision remains substantially one-sided and within
the absolute discretion of the school officials. 47 Prior discussion of the
facts could easily become a mere formality instead of the intended
meaningful communication between the administrator and the student.
Goss requires only the minimum procedural safeguards of notice and
prior hearing before suspension may be imposed. 48 In light of the
importance of education to the student and the possibility of injustice
42. Id.
43. Id. The short suspension as an education or disciplinary tool is often abused,
administered arbitrarily, and applied racially disproportionately. See generally DEP'T OF
HEW, THE SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION OF CHILDREN FROM SCHOOL 15 (J. Regal ed. 1971);
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF DEP-TOF HEW, NATIONAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY &
SECONDARY SCHOOLS (1973); TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN OUTOF SCHOOL, THE WAY WE Go
TO SCHOOL (1971).
44. 419 U.S. at 581.
45. Id. at 581-82.
46. Id. at 582. Summary suspension may be necessary when a student's presence poses
a continuing danger to persons or property or threatens to disrupt the academic process.
Id.
47. Goss required only oral or written notice, an explanation of the charges and
evidence, and the opportunity to the student to present his own version of the facts. The
abstract requirement of notice and informal hearing is in practice an uncertain standard, so
amorphous as to be almost meaningless in terms of establishing definite administrative
guidelines. Nolte, School Boards, AM. SCHOOL BD. J. 33 (April 1975).
The requirement of an adequate hearing represents only the minimum degree of
interference with school administration. The disciplinary decision remains within
administrative discretion. See Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV.
1027, 1059-60 (1969); Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1045, 1151 (1968).
48. 419 U.S. at 582-83.
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and harm imposed as a result of summary discipline, the student
arguably should be afforded additional safeguards. 49 The rudimentary
hearing requirement alone may be ineffective without the right to the
assistance of counsel, especially in light of the inexperience of the
student and the probable unfamiliarity of the parents with the discipli-
nary process. 50 The Court explicitly warned that more severe discipli-
nary sanctions, such as expulsions and long suspensions, would warrant
greater procedural protection, including the right to secure counsel, to
cross-examine witnesses, and to administrative or judicial review.5 1
The importance of Goss is not limited to the formality or informality
of the procedures required to satisfy due process, but includes the fact
that due process protection was found applicable to any exclusion from
public school.5 2 Goss extends the mandate of Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education from due process protection of state college stu-
49. These additional procedures, while not absolute constitutional requirements,
could be required to satisfy the due process standard of fairness, depending upon the facts
of a particular case. The additional procedures could include: the right to counsel, the right
to an impartial tribunal, the right to develop a record, and the right to judicial review. See
generally Abbott, supra note 38, at 396-400; Buss, supra note 38, at 600-36.
50. There are strong parallels between school discipline and the juvenile justice
system: desire on the part of administrators to avoid adversary judicial procedures, need
for flexibility and discretion in administration, the common aim of protecting and
providing for the best interest of the minor. Recent cases have, however, significantly
expanded the procedural safeguards in juvenile proceedings. E.g., In reWinship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See generally Gyory, The ConstitutionalRights
of Public School Pupils, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 201 (1971).
51. 419 U.S. at 582-83.
52. Id. at 581. Since 1961 the courts have become more involved and more critical of
the disciplinary procedures of public schools. In general, this increased judicial interven-
tion reflects a certain skepticism about the effectiveness of education that involves not
just the courts but parents, students and educators as well. This new critical sensitivity to
education as a system within an administrative framework in addition to existing judicial
involvement in matters of racial discrimination has contributed to the development of
student rights. See generally Beaney, Students, Higher Education, & the Law, 45 DENVER
L.J. 511 (1968); Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights,
118 U. PA. L. REV. 612 (1970).
The development of procedural protection for students is best illustrated by the
evolving case law: Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (notice and hearing required before expulsion of public
university student); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo.
1967), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970) (notice and
hearing required before long suspensions from state college); Williams v. Dade County
School Bd., 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971) (notice and hearing required before additional
30-day suspension from public high school); Givens v. Poe, 436 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C.
1972) (all suspensions require notice and hearing; this court was particularly concerned
with the abuse of consecutive short suspensions that in effect exclude the student from




dents facing expulsion to public high school students facing temporary
suspensions. To the dissent, however, Goss represented an unneces-
sary expansion of procedural due process53 and a dangerous departure
from the traditional limited role of the judiciary in the supervision of
public education: "[the Court's] indiscriminate reliance upon the
judiciary and the adversary process as the means of resolving many of
the most routine problems arising in the classroom" is an "unprec-
edented intrusion into the process of elementary and secondary educa-
tion [by the federal courts].'54
A certain tension remains between what the Constitution seems to
demand of school authorities, what the courts are willing to actively
enforce, and what the administrators are willing to implement in the
daily operation of public schools.5 5 Despite the protections of Goss, it
remains possible for a student to be temporarily deprived of a public
education for relatively minor offenses. 56
53. 419 U.S. at 588-96 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that the Court's
"constitutionalization of routine classroom decisions" disregards the basic structure of
Ohio law, represents an inappropriate extension of due process protection, ignores the
special need for discipline and order in public schools, misapprehends the reality of the
teacher-pupil relationship, and refuses to recognize those traditional differences between
the rights and duties of adults and those of children. In addition, the dissent stated that the
Court's notice and hearing requirements do not provide significantly more protection than
that already available under the statute. Id.
54. Id. at 594, 597-99 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent was apprehensive that the
Court's recognition of the protected interest in education will result in judicial review of
purely educational, discretionary decisions which are beyond the expertise of judges. The
dissent warned that the Court must distinguish "between the discretionary decision to
suspend and the type of discretionary decisions [which relate to grading, promotion,
tracking etc.] or the federal courts should prepare themselves for a vast new role in
society." Id. An example of such a new role would be the capacity of federal judges, in
certain circumstances, to become, in effect, school administrators.
55. Before Goss courts had varied on the length of the suspension necessary for the
application of procedural due process protection. Compare Black Students of N. Ft.
Myers Jr.-Sr. High School v. Williams, 317 F. Supp. 1211 (M.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd, 470 F.2d
957 (5th Cir. 1972) (10-day suspension), with Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C.
1972) (all suspensions). Compare Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist., 462
F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972) (possible due process problems in connection with suspensions of
even a few hours), with Hernandez v. School Dist. No. 1,315 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1970)
(due process inapplicable to 25-day suspension). Compare Sullivan v. Houston Indepen-
dent School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973) (initial
deprivation of due process cured by subsequent adequate hearing), with Pervis v.
LaMarque Independent School Dist., 328 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 466 F.2d
1054 (5th Cir. 1972) (initial deprivation of due process is not curable by subsequent
adequate hearing).
56. Substantive reform of school codes is essential. SeeWright, supra note 47, at 1060.
Exclusions for disciplinary reasons are not usually considered by courts to be in any way
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In principle Goss can be expanded to provide due process protection
for non-exclusionary forms of disciplinary action, such as corporal
punishment,57 withdrawal of school privileges and activities, 58 and
intra-district disciplinary transfers.59 Goss may also provide the basis
for judicial intervention into purely academic areas, traditionally within
the absolute discretion of teachers and administrators. 60 The recognition
of public education as a protected property right may stimulate a
inconsistent with compulsory attendance laws. See, e.g., Betts v. Board of Educ., 466
F.2d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 1972); Linwood v. Board of Educ., 463 F.2d 763,767 n.5 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972); Davis v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schools, 313 F. Supp. 1217,
1226 (E.D. Mich. 1970). See generally Cole, Expulsion and Long-Term Suspension: Is It
Legal?, 4 J.L. & EDJC. 325 (1975) (questions exclusion from school for discipline
problems and the difficulty of developing procedures for readmittance).
Several cases have recently considered the problem of exclusion from school of
mentally retarded and behavior problem children and imposed strict procedural
safeguards to prevent or minimize such exclusion. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 367 F. Supp. 666 (W.D.N.C. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 963
(1973); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
57. See Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975)
(required procedural protection of student before corporal punishment administered). It is
unsettled whether the eighth amendment (which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment)
is applicable to the corporal punishment of school students. Compare Gonyaw v. Gray,
361 F. Supp. 366, 368 (D. Vt. 1973) (inapplicable), with Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248,
259 n.20 (5th Cir. 1974) andNelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974) (applicable).
58. E.g., Scott v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Ala, 1969)
(suspensions plus withholding of campus jobs and opportunity to participate in practice-
teaching program open to other students); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ.,
293 F. Supp. 485,492 (M.D. Tenn. 1968) (suspension of basketball team from interscholas-
tic competition with possible serious effect on future education and employment of
talented player).
59. See generally Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional& Policy Implications of
Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 705 (1973).
60. Those academic administrative decisions which consider grading and testing,
admissions or graduation criteria, or curriculum have been traditionally beyond the scope
of review by the courts. See, e.g., Wright v. Texas S. Univ., 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968)
(no deprivation of constitutional right to deny admission to university student who is
scholastically ineligible for readmission); Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156
(D. Vt. 1965) (dismissal of medical student for scholastic deficiency); Mustell v. Rose, 282
Ala. 358, 211 So. 2d 489 (1968) (dismissal of medical student for poor grades as matter of
discretion, not ordinarily open to judicial review); Wong v. University of Calif., 15 Cal.
App. 3d 823, 93 Cal. Rptr. 502 (Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (medical school admission). But see
Greenhill v. Bailey, 378 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Iowa 1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975)
(judicial review of medical grades and evaluation; damaging general evaluation of intellec-
tual capability of medical student with poor grades); Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla.





reexamination of more controversial aspects of public education,
including in-school grouping or tracking6 and de facto racial62 and
economic discrimination.63
Marilyn J. Tanaka
61. See Kirp, supra note 59. If due process protection extends to short suspensions
from school, the classification of students on the basis of testing (tracking or ability
grouping) could also be challenged on due process grounds. Tracking arguably involves agreater deprivation of education than does a short suspension. Tracking is a long-durationdecision which affects the student significantly, is typically very visible, involves theimposition of "stigma," is open to misclassification mistakes, and is usually not a matter
open to questioning or challenge by the parents or student. While suspension is temporary,
though psychologically serious, tracking, which is no less psychologically damaging, can
result in a prolonged period of inferior education. See generally Sorgen, Testing and
Tracking in Public Schools, 24 HASMNGS L.J. 1129 (1973).
62. E.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Calif. 1972); Moses v. Washington
Parish School Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 1285(5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub
nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (invalidation of tracking system;
racial discrimination).
63. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
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